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The purpose of this thesis is to develop a prototype safety information
management tool to capture human error in Naval Aviation maintenance mishaps. The
Human Factors Analysis and Classification System-Maintenance Extension taxonomy, an
effective framework for classifying and analyzing the presence of maintenance errors that
lead to mishaps, incidents, and personal injuries, is the foundation of this management
tool. The target audience for this information management system tool includes safety
personnel, mishap investigators, Aircraft Mishap Board (AMB) members, and analysts.
A review of three areas is needed to produce the prototype: (1) the collection, use, and
management of accident information, (2) human error theories as related to aviation
mishaps, and (3) the design of an effective mishap database tool. A usability study was
conducted using potential end-users (Naval Aviation Safety Officers). The participants
are given both written procedures to navigate through the prototype and an exit survey.
The results of the survey, including objective and subjective responses about the
prototype are gathered. The resulting data indicates an improved version of the prototype
could directly lead to a decreased mishap rate and overall increased mission readiness
due to the training and analysis opportunity it provides.
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Naval Aviation has had great success in substantially reducing (by half) its Class
A Flight Mishap (FM) rate in each successive decade between 1950 and 1999 (see
Figure 1). Despite this achievement, the proportion ofmishaps attributed to human error
has remained at a relative constant rate of about four in five (Nutwell & Sherman, 1 997).
In 1996, a Navy F-14 Tomcat crashed shortly after taking off from Nashville, Tennessee
killing both aircrew and three civilians on the ground (HFQMB, 1997). As a result of
this causes of this mishap being was solely attributable to human (aircrew) error, senior
Naval Leadership established a Human Factors Quality Management Board (HFQMB)
with the objective of reducing human error involvement in Naval Aviation Class A flight
mishaps by 50 percent at the start of fiscal year (FY) 2000 (HFQMB, 1997). Aircrew
human error was found to be a contributing factor in 60 percent of Class A FMs and,
consequently, was the initial focus of the HFQMB. Although Naval Aviation had its
lowest Class A FM rate in FY 1999, the HFQMB's goal of reducing human error related
mishaps by 50 percent was not achieved (Naval Safety Center, 1999). Thus, the scope of
the HFQMB was expanded to include the reduction ofhuman error in maintenance
related aviation mishaps. Maintenance human error contributed to about 20 percent of
the Class A FM rate (Naval Safety Center, 1999). This thesis contributes to this endeavor
by developing an information management system to facilitate the characterization and
analysis ofhuman error in Naval Aviation maintenance related mishaps.
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Figure 1: Naval Aviation Class A Flight Mishap Rates for FY 1950-1999
(School of Aviation Safety, 1999)
The HFQMB's (1997) strategy to achieve its objective consists of a three-pronged
approach: (1) Mishap Data Analysis (MDA), (2) Organizational Benchmarking (OB),
and (3) Command Safety Assessment (CSA). MDA identifies human factors issues in
past Class A FMs. Target areas were prioritized for intervention based upon the presence
of prevailing human errors. The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System
(HFACS) of identifying causal factors through examination of past mishaps was
developed to achieve this end. OB is the second approach used to identify the best
practices and procedures in other aviation organizations, both military and civilian. For
example, the US Army attributed its reduced Class A FM rate to the use of Risk
Management by its aircrew. Consequently, Operational Risk Management (ORM) was
adopted by Naval Aviation and established as a part of doctrine (Department of the Navy-
-DON, 1997). CSA was developed to assess a command's safety climate from an aircrew
perspective (Ciavarelli & Figlock, 1997). It solicits opinions/attitudes about
organizational safety processes and command climate. CSAs may eventually show that
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both organizational and supervisory issues impact flight safety (Nutwell & Sherman,
1997).
In January 1999, the Vice Chief ofNaval Operations revised the goal to reduce
human error in Naval Aviation Class A FMs by 50 percent by the end ofFY2000
(Personal communication between T. Meyers and B. Goodrum, 1999). Presently one of
every five Class A FMs contain maintenance error. This compelled the HFQMB to
expand its focus to include maintenance related mishaps using the same three-prong
approach as used for aircrew error analysis.
(2) Maintenance Mishap Data Analysis (MDA)
The analytic framework for examining aircrew and supervisory error in Class A
FMs was FIFACS. HFACS is a taxonomy which falls in line with the Naval Aviation
Safety Program's notion of multiple causal factors, the idea of sequential events leading
to an event, and several established human factors theories. HFACS was adjusted and
adopted to cover maintenance operations, and the extension was successfully used to
examine major mishaps (Schmidt, Schmorrow, & Hardee, 1997), minor mishaps
(Schmidt, Schmorrow, & Figlock, 2000), and incidents/injury (Schmidt, Figlock, &
Teeters, 1999) data. The Navy has included an adjusted version of the Maintenance
Extension ofHFACS (HFACS-ME) for inclusion in the upcoming revision of the Naval
Aviation Safety Program Instruction (DON, 2000).
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT
In order to continue to reduce its Class A FM rate, Naval Aviation leadership
must understand that all mishaps are not caused solely by aircrew error. The analysis of
maintenance related mishaps offers an increased opportunity to reduce target mishaps
and enhance readiness. The HFACS-ME taxonomy has been adapted to classify causal
factors that contribute to maintenance mishaps. A modern database tool is essential in
more effectively addressing and identifying patterns ofhuman error using HFACS-ME.
However, there is no such tool available today. The target audience for such a tool would
include safety personnel (e.g., data entry and retrieval by unit safety officers, other safety
and training personnel, maintenance officers, maintenance supervisors), mishap
investigators-for data retrieval (e.g., Aircraft Mishap Board members, squadron safety
officers), and analysts (e.g., from the Naval Safety Center, the command's safety officer
or one from its higher headquarters).
This thesis investigates the following questions:
1
.
How could human errors in maintenance related Naval Aviation
mishaps be effectively collected, cataloged, and collated in an information system?
2. How could customers query and use this maintenance error information
in order to identify problem areas and trends?
3. How would customers in the fleet effectively and efficiently access
maintenance error information in Naval Aviation mishaps?
C. PURPOSE
The intent of this study is to develop and evaluate a safety information
management system that will facilitate data collection, organization, query, analysis, and
reporting of maintenance personnel errors that contribute to Naval Aviation mishaps,
equipment damage, and personnel injury using the HFACS-ME taxonomy as its basis.
Drawing upon several theoretical approaches to examine mishaps involving
human error, including Heinrich's "Domino" Theory, Edwards' "SHEL" Model, and
Reason's "Swiss Cheese" Model, helps to identify not only the unsafe actions causing a
mishap, but latent conditions which set the stage for mishaps to occur. HFACS-ME is a
composite derivative of these three taxonomies. It classifies and analyzes the presence of
human error in maintenance operations leading to major mishaps, accidents of lesser
severity, incidents, and maintenance related personal injury cases. However, working
with a large database by hand or spreadsheet is very labor intensive. Given the capability
of current relevant database tools, an improved information management system will
bring HFACS-ME to the next level by improving access and analysis of safety data.
Though there is no generally accepted method of accident investigation (Benner, 1975),
standardized aircraft accident investigation procedures have been adopted by civilian and
military agencies throughout the world (Diehl, 1991).
The result of this study leads to a development of a tool that: (1) captures
maintenance error associated with maintenance related incidents; (2) facilitates the
identification ofcommon maintenance errors and associated trends; and (3) supports
understanding ofhow to identify human errors in the future.
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
Fleet personnel, primarily Aviation Safety Officers, will test the prototype
Maintenance Extension Information Management System (MEIMS) tool (hereafter
referred to as the prototype). The prototype to be developed is to be used by Naval
Aviation squadrons, but may have some crossover use by other military branches and
civilian airlines. Only maintenance related mishaps caused by human error will be
considered. No material failure factors or maintenance related hazard reports or
personnel injuries not related to a mishap are to be included.
E. DEFINITIONS
This study uses the following definitions:
Aircraft Mishap Board . Group of officers appointed to investigate and report on
an aviation mishap (DON, 1991).
Aviation mishap rate . Number of aviation mishaps per 1 00,000 flight hours
(DON, 1991).
Aviation Safety Officer . Principal advisor to Naval Aviation squadron
commanding officers on all aviation safety matters (DON, 1991)
F-14 Tomcat . US Navy aircraft. Two aircrew, two engines, swing-wing,
supersonic fighter with air-to-air, air-to-ground, and reconnaissance capability (Rowe &
Morrison, 1973).
Fleet Logistics Support Wing . US Navy reserve air wing comprised of transport
aircraft (Schmidt, Schmorrow, & Teeters, 1999).
HFACS : Human Factors Analysis and Classification System. System designed
to help analyze Naval Aviation mishaps focusing on aircrew error (Shappell &
Wiegmann, 1997).
HFACS-ME: Human Factors Analysis and Classification System—Maintenance
Extension . HFACS adaptation to classify causal factors that contribute to maintenance
mishaps (Schmidt, 1996).
HFQMB : Human Factors Quality Management Board. Established by Naval
Aviation senior leadership to reduce human error involvement in Naval Aviation Class A
flight mishaps (HFQMB, 1997).
MEIMS: Maintenance Error Information Management System . Prototype tool
developed for this thesis.
Mishap . A naval mishap is an unplanned event or series of events directly
involving naval aircraft, which result in $10,000 or greater cumulative damage to naval
aircraft, other aircraft, property, or personnel injury (DON, 1991).
Mishap Categories . Naval aircraft mishap categories are defined below (DON,
1991):
Flight Mishap (FM) . Those mishaps in which there was $10,000 or greater
DOD aircraft damage or loss of a DOD aircraft, and intent for flight for DOD
aircraft existed at the time of the mishap. Other property damage, injury, or death
may or may not have occurred.
Flight Related Mishap (FRM) . Those mishaps in which there was less than
$10,000 DOD aircraft damage, and intent for flight (for DOD aircraft) existed at
the time of the mishap, and $10,000 or more total damage or a defined injury or
death occurred.
Aircraft Ground Mishap (AGM) . Those mishaps in which no intent for
flight existed at the time of the mishap and DOD aircraft loss, or $10,000 or more
aircraft damage, and/or property damage, or a defined injury or death occurred.
Mishap Severity Class . Mishap severity classes are based on personnel injury and
property damage (DON, 1991):
Class A . A mishap in which the total cost of property damage (including
all aircraft damage) is $1,000,000 or greater; or a naval aircraft is destroyed or
missing; or any fatality or permanent total disability occurs with direct
involvement of naval aircraft.
Class B . A mishap in which the total cost of property damage (including
all aircraft damage) is $200,000 or more, but less than $1,000,000 and/or a
permanent partial disability, and/or the hospitalization of five or more personnel.
Class C . A mishap in which the total cost of property damage (including
all aircraft damage) is $10,000 or more but less then $200,000 and/or injury
results in five or more lost workdays.
Naval Aircraft . Refers to US Navy, US Naval Reserve, US Marine Corps, and US
Marine Corps aircraft.
OPNAVINST 3750.6: The Naval Aviation Safety Program . US Navy instruction
outlining Naval Aviation's safety program. Revision Q-1991, revision R-in work (DON,
1991 & 2000).
ORM: Operational Risk Management . A decision making tool to increase
effectiveness (and hence decrease accidents) by anticipating hazards, reducing the
potential for loss due to these hazards, and thus increasing the probability of a successful
mission (DON 1997).
F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
Chapter II contains a literature review on the development of a prototype to
identify human error involvement and patterns in aviation maintenance mishaps. The
methods used in this study are discussed in Chapter III. The results of this study are
presented in Chapter IV. Finally, Chapter V contains conclusions, findings, and
recommendations.




The literature examined relates to the development of a prototype to identify
human error involvement and patterns in aviation maintenance mishaps. It includes
textbooks, research articles, and masters theses pertaining to: (1) the collection, use, and
management of accident information, (2) human error theories, its involvement in
aviation mishaps, and specifically maintenance mishaps, and (3) design and usability of
an effective mishap database tool. Collectively, these information sources provide a
foundation to develop an effective and user friendly maintenance error analysis and
reporting tool.
Diehl (1991), in a three-stage model of accident investigation and prevention,
focuses on human performance and systems safety considerations (see Figure 2). The
first stage is Accident Generation: the identification of hazards. Hazards have the
potential to lead to an incident (near-accident) or even an accident. Heinrich (1941)
study of thousands of accidents determined that for every major accident, there are
approximately 30 minor accidents, and 300 hazardous incidents. This pyramidal
relationship between hazards, incidents, and accidents also applies to aviation safety
(Diehl, 1991).
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Figure 2: Accident Generation, Investigation, and Prevention Elements
(Adapted from Diehl, 1989)
The second stage is the Accident Investigation Process: the collection, analysis,
and review of accident data and the focus of this review. Accidents rarely result from a
single sudden event, but are normally associated with a series of events degrading the
performance of the equipment, crewmen, or both, until the accident is inevitable (Nance,
1986). Investigating bodies have established similar aircraft accident investigation
procedures. The fact-finding phase takes place near the scene of the accident to establish
what happened. Next, the information analysis emphasizes on describing what caused
the accident and why it occurred (Diehl, 1991). Part of that analysis is based on
examining comparative data sources: information about both the normal and emergency
performance of the aircraft, as well as human capabilities and limitations. Investigators
are now able to theorize as to the causal factors of the accident and its probable sequence
of events. Once the analysis is complete a final report is developed by board authorities
with the accepted findings, causes, and recommendations. This phase isjudgmental in
nature.
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The final stage contains the Prevention Measures (and methods) used to avoid
future similar incidents. There are four categories of accident-prevention measures:
(1) eliminating hazards and risks, (2) incorporating safety features (3) providing warning
devices, and (4) establishing procedural safeguards. As one travels from right to left
along the bottom leg of Diehl's triangle, the measures become less expensive, less
effective, and less restrictive. (Diehl, 1991).
B. ACCIDENT INFORMATION
(1) Investigation
Accidents occur within an organizational/systems context, and understanding the
involved systems and operating environment can provide an enhanced framework for
investigating accidents and determining their causes (Wagenaar, Groeneweg, & Hudson,
1994). During the initial phase of an investigation retrospective analysis of past accidents
can help to focus on areas of high risk and identify groups of potential causal factors
(McElroy, 1974). Effective interventions can then be identified and subsequently
implemented to reduce accident occurrence. However, the perceptions of accident
investigators can be skewed and thus diminish the effectiveness of an investigation
(Benner, 1982). Therefore, a systematic process for investigating and reporting accidents
is imperative.
Grimaldi & Simonds (1984) detailed a four-part process for investigations. The
first step is to explore the history of the incident as far back as is practical, including
activities occurring both during and prior to the event. Second, the investigator must
collect as many facts relating to the incident as possible (from reliable witnesses). Next,
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the physical environment associated with the accident must be examined. Finally, the use
of a defining guide listing common causal factors can be used to determine probable
causal factors of the incident itself. This process parallels aspects of that provided by
Diehl (1991) in his model of aviation accident investigation.
Though there is no generally accepted method of accident investigation (Benner,
1975), standardized aircraft accident investigation procedures have been adopted by
civilian and military agencies throughout the world (Diehl, 1991).
(2) Reporting
Accident reports have generally centered on number of episodes and observations
per unit time (Brown, 1990a). Frequencies and rates alone, however, do not provide a
sound basis for understanding accidents (Brown, 1990a). The conventional process of
reporting accidents by a description followed by supporting documentation varies in
scope, depth, quality, objectivity, and contains inconsistencies and varying levels of
completeness (Edwards, 1981). In addition, the traditional reporting format does not
normally capture human factors information (Adams, Barlow, & Hiddlestone, 1981). To
increase the usability of mishap reports, the information they contain must assist in the
determination of cause and prevention of future accidents by ensuring collection,
classification, and data recording methods are accurate and reliable. The usefulness of
the reports is greatly increased when bias is removed and any future potential (based on
frequency or severity) of occurrence is easily used (Adams & Hartwell, 1977).
Three elements critical to the success of an accident reporting system are
(Chapanis, 1996): (1) properly trained investigators, (2) a good accident reporting form,
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and (3) a centralized facility for dealing with reports. If a mishap reporting system is
unable to either prevent or reduce the severity of future accidents (Brown, 1990b)
subsequent data analysis can be problematic (Pimble & O'Toole, 1982). Analysis of data
from typical reporting systems has been accomplished through the following process:
• collecting data on past accidents within a population;
• dividing the sample into groups with and without accidents;
• obtaining measurements of individual characteristics on all participants;
• statistically comparing the two groups; and
• identifying any significant difference between the two groups, associating the
differential characteristic with accidents.
Using these methods has resulted in a more complete and thorough analysis effort.
This general style of accident reporting has been used by many studies, but its
methods have also been concluded to be suspect (Hale & Hale, 1972; Hansen 1988; Shaw
& Sichel, 1971). The symptom may not actually be responsible for the accident, but may
be related to another (correlative) variable which may, in fact, bear responsibility.
Recently, accident reporting tools have been advanced and are supporting more rigorous
and ordered methods of analysis (Leplat, 1989; Malaterre, 1990; Reason, 1990. The
ability of a report to distinguish between causal and correlative variables determines its
utility (Hill, Byers, Rothblum, & Booth, 1994).
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(3) Data Management
Once data pertaining to an accident is collected, it must be archived for use in
accident prevention (National Safety News, 1975). Many methods of recording this
information are in use, but some fundamental concepts are recognized including coding
the data and the use of computer databases to quickly and efficiently store and retrieve
information. In addition, the attributes of the data are critical in ensuring the best
information is collected and stored for future use.
The National Safety Council (National Safety News, 1975) established a method
of facilitating the sorting and tabulation of accident particulars. Numerical codes are
assigned to the different classifications in the mishap. Therefore, the specific case is read
once when its facts are assigned code numbers. Concentrating on one phase of the
accident problem at a time is a more effective way to reduce incidents than to deliberate
on the mishap as a whole. Merely obtaining the information will not prevent recurrence
of the accidents. The conditions contributing to the incident must be corrected.
Subsequent sorting of these facts by category can then be completed quickly by simply
referencing the code numbers.
The Swedish Information System (ISA) on Occupational Accidents and Diseases
was developed in 1979 to improve the work environment through increasing knowledge
about risks (Andersson & Lagerlof, 1983). The ISA's goal is accomplished through the
collection of information in four areas: (1) knowledge about risks, (2) knowledge about
preventive actions, (3) cost-benefit analysis, and (4) a "will" to change (see Figure 3). To
identify a risk, the experience of one accident of a specific type is viewed as enough, and
consequently accident prevention has traditionally been very case-related. However,
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experience alone is not satisfactory for identifying and evaluating risks since minor
incidents are frequently given less attention and major ones occur less frequently. The
ISA system provides reports based on its database: periodic statistics, focused statistics,
















Figure 3: Swedish Information System on Occupational Accidents and
Diseases (ISA) (Andersson & Lagerlof, 1983)
It is common to have a system that only reports incidents resulting in an accident
(Grimaldi & Simonds, 1984). However, it is important to recognize "near-miss" cases in
order to identify potential conditions or practices that are accident producing types and
prevent their future occurrence. Essentially the same form could be used in both accident
and near-miss incidents.
Setting up a computer analysis can reduce man-hours involved in reviewing
mishap histories (Kuhlman, 1977). To set up an effective program, the available
information needs to be organized and tabulated into categories. This information then




Interest in accident prevention did not begin until the beginning of the 20th
century when employers realized that it was less expensive to prevent accidents than to
pay for their consequences (Petersen, 1978). Organizations confronted with the challenge
ofhow best to protect themselves and their employees from accidents have two options,
namely, insurance and accident prevention programs (Pate-Cornell, 1 996), and
organizations typically employ both options (Kanis & Weegels, 1990).
Accident prevention was initially based on a widely held notion that people
committing unsafe acts, not their working conditions, were to blame for most accidents
(Heinrich, 1959). This thinking fostered a preoccupation with assigning blame to people;
a practice which hindered the development of systematic accident prevention well into
the later half of this century (Manuele, 1981). Narrowly focusing on people and not on
the environment in which they operate, tended to obscure a subset of associated causal
factors. This is particularly true with systems that chronically expose individuals to
hazards (Schmidt, 1987). Although there have been substantial advances in accident
prevention in recent decades, the practice ofblaming individuals for the accident, rather
than the conditions associated with it, persists. This practice must be overcome and
accidents must be analyzed in terms of the systems in which they occur.
The most effective accident prevention strategies employ systems engineering
(Hawkins, 1993). The systems engineering approach was developed in the 1950s as part
of the United States military's large-scale weapons programs. Systems engineering
transforms operational needs into a description of system parameters and integrates them
to optimize overall system effectiveness (Edwards, 1988). In addition, it focuses the level
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of analysis on the smallest identifiable system components and how these components
interact (Bird, 1980). The strategy of focusing on the system through the development of
well-defined system components exposes information that would have remained
unknown without a system-level evaluation (Miller, 1988).
Systems engineering pays attention to the strengths and limitations of the human
operator as an integral part of the system (Heinrich, Petersen, & Roos, 1980). The
literature suggests that 80-90 percent of accidents are attributable to human error
(Heinrich, Petersen, & Roos, 1980; Hale & Glendon, 1987; School of Aviation Safety,
2000). Therefore, evaluating human factors associated with accidents can contribute to
the understanding of systems and how they fail.
Operational Risk Management (ORM) is another tool used by the armed forces to
decrease aviation accident rates. It is a decision making tool used by personnel at all
levels to increase effectiveness (and hence decrease accidents) by anticipating hazards,
reducing the potential for loss due to these hazards, and thus increasing the probability of
a successful mission (DON, 1997). The aviation arm of the United States Army achieved
record low accident rates in 1995 and 1996 attributing a large portion of their success to
the use ofORM (Department of the Army, 2000). The remaining military services
institutionalized ORM in 1997 in attempt to lower their own rates (School of Aviation
Safety, 2000). ORM emphasizes identifying hazards and reducing their associated risk to
an acceptable level through the use of control measures (DON, 1997). It is especially
effective in identifying and analyzing human factor hazards as well.
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C. HUMAN ERROR
Knowledge derived from the analysis ofhuman errors can greatly improve safety.
There are numerous theoretical approaches to examine mishaps involving human error
(Goetsch, 1996). Some methods have their basis in industrial safety, while others are
viewed from a more complex systems perspective, with an emphasis on human factors
and operator error. Table 1 outlines some of the more well-known approaches.
Table 1: Theoretical Approaches to Defining Accident Processes (Schmidt, 1998)
Source Model Approach
Industrial Safety Heinrich's Domino Theory Linear
Systems Safety Edwards' SHEL Model Interface
Human Factors Reason's Swiss Cheese Model Vertical
(1) Heinrich's "Domino" Theory
The original accident causation theory is considered to be Heinrich's "Domino"
Theory (Goetsch, 1996). Heinrich believed accidents could be viewed as a linear five
step sequence of related factors (chain of events) that lead to an actual mishap (Bird,
1980). The two central principles of the Domino Theory are (Goetsch, 1996): (1)
accidents are caused by the actions of the preceding factors, and (2) removal of the
middle factor (unsafe act or condition) will negate the actions of the preceding factors
and thus prevent accidents and injuries (see Figure 4).
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Figure 4: Domino Theory (School of Aviation Safety, 1998)
The following is a characterization of each domino (Bird, 1980):
• Lack of Control by Management (lack of supervision). The professional
manager has four control functions: planning, organizing, leading, and
controlling. Managers at all levels and all activities must perform these
functions to ensure proper completion of work.
• Basic Cause(s) of incident--Origin(s). A lack of management control (domino
one) allows certain basic causes of incidents to exist. These causes are
classified into two separate categories:
o Personal Factors: denoted by a lack ofknowledge or skill, improper
motivation, physical or mental problems. Personal factors explain
why people engage in substandard practices.
o Job Factors: denoted by inadequate work standards, inadequate design
or maintenance, inadequate purchasing standards, normal wear and
tear, abnormal usage. Job factors explain why substandard conditions
exist.
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• Immediate Cause(s)—Symptoms (unsafe act/condition). If basic causes of
incidents exist, the opportunity for actual substandard practices and conditions
(errors) also exists. A substandard practice or condition is a deviation from an
accepted standard or practice.
• Incident—Contact. If substandard practices and conditions exist, an incident
may occur that may or may not result in a loss. Of note, every incident that
occurs provides an opportunity to collect data that could prevent a future
occurrence.
• Accident: Loss of People or Property. Once an incident has occurred it can
result in a loss of personnel or property.
Each step causes the next to occur, as would a series of falling dominos. If factors from
any of the first three dominos are removed, the accident will effectively be prevented.
(2) Edwards' "SHEL" Model
The "SHEL" Model (Edwards, 1988) was developed in the early 1970s to provide
a more effective means to evaluate human-machine systems failures. The model
identifies and classifies four dimensions in evaluating human-machine systems failures:
Software, Hardware, Environment, and Liveware.
• Software (S): rules, regulations, laws, orders, standard operating procedures,
customs, practices, and habits that govern the manner in which the system
operates and in which the information within it is organized; typically, a
collection of documents.
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• Hardware (H): buildings, vehicles, equipment, and materials of which the
system is comprised.
• Environmental conditions (E): operating setting (physical, economic, political
and social factors) of the software, hardware, and liveware operate.
• Liveware (L): people involved with the system.
Thus the SHEL Model is comprised of these system dimensions and the








Figure 5: SHEL Model of System Design (Hawkins, 1993)
The SHEL Model assumes that a failure in the system will occur when one of the
dimensions or the connection between them fails (Edwards, 1988). People are rarely the
only cause of a mishap. They are, in fact, caused by the interaction of many factors
(Shappell & Wiegmann, 1997). The SHEL Model is a significant change from the
previously held idea that mishaps have single cause factors (Edwards, 1981). The SHEL
Model describes systems, identifies areas for concern in a system, and provides a
framework for accident investigation.
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(3) Reason's "Swiss Cheese" Model
The Swiss Cheese model (Reason, 1 990) of accident causation is another widely
accepted perspective. Reason took a human factors approach to view the vertical
association of a group of factors that lead to an eventual accident. His model
differentiates between two error types: (1) active failures—the actions (or inactions) of
operators that are believed to have caused the accident, and (2) latent conditions-
situations primarily caused by management decisions or actions whose repercussions may
only become apparent when they are triggered by other mitigating factors. The
conjunction between context and acts, when taken together, are latent conditions. Latent
conditions set the groundwork for an accident while active failures are the final catalyst
for the mishap to occur. Safeguards in a system can prevent latent conditions from taking
effect by reducing the probability for the commission of an active failure. Thus Reason's
model seen as Swiss cheese slices' lined in a row, with each vertical slice representing a
defense layer and each hole representing an active failure or latent condition in the












Figure 6: Reason's Swiss Cheese Model (Schmidt & Lawson, 2000)
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Reason's (1997) model is not static, but dynamic, with each defensive layer
moving according to the characteristics of the situation (Reason, 1997). An event may
occur in one of three levels: (1) person-unsafe acts, (2) workplace-error provoking
conditions, and (3) organization-error establishing conditions. The starting point for an
accident occurs with organizational factors; strategic decisions and associated processes
(resource allocation, budgeting, forecasting, planning) are initiated. These
organizationally established processes are shaped and influenced by a corporate culture
being distributed throughout the organization to individual workplaces. Corporate
processes evidence themselves as inadequate staffing, time pressures, equipment,
training, and working conditions. These factors, combined with the natural proclivity to
commit errors and/or violations results in unsafe acts. Very few of these acts actually
create holes in the defense layers en route to becoming an accident (Reason, 1997).
(4) Human Factors Analysis & Classification System (HFACS)
A restructuring and expansion of the Swiss Cheese Model evolved into HFACS
which was specifically designed to help analyze Naval Aviation mishaps (Shappell &
Wiegmann, 1997). HFACS focuses on aircrew error and also incorporates features of
Heinrich's Domino Theory and Edwards' SHEL Model. The resulting taxonomy of
unsafe operations identifies both active failures and latent conditions within four
categories (DON, 2000): (1) unsafe acts; (2) pre-conditions for unsafe acts; (3) unsafe
supervision, and (4) organizational influences. This classification can then be, and, in
fact, has been, used to target the most appropriate intervention (see Figure 7). The Naval
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Safety Center has adopted the use of the HFACS model for analysis of aircrew error in
Naval Aviation mishaps.
Figure 7: Levels of Human-Component Failure (Schmidt, 1998)
The following is a brief description of the HFACS taxonomy (DON, 2000).
Unsafe acts take two forms: (1) errors and (2) violations. Errors are found in most
mishaps due to the facts that human beings by their nature make mistakes and are often
the last flaw before the mishap occurs. There are three basic error types: (1) decision, (2)
perceptual, and (3) skill-based. Violations, on the other hand, are the willful disregard for
the rules and are not seen in as many mishaps. They are also further categorized into
routine and exceptional violation categories. Pre-conditionsfor unsafe acts set the table
for the unsafe act to occur. Its two major subdivisions are (1) substandard conditions of
operators and (2) substandard practices of operators. Substandard conditions included
adverse mental and physiological states and physical/mental limitations. Substandard
practices include crew resource management and personal readiness. Failures associated
with unsafe supervision are divided into four areas: (1) inadequate supervision, (2)
planned inappropriate operations, (3) failure to correct a known problem, and (4)
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supervisory violations. Upper-level management failures, or organizational influences,
directly effect not only supervisory practices, but operator conditions and actions. These
latent failures can be traced to issues dealing with resource management, organizational
climate, and operational processes.
(5) Human Error in Maintenance Mishaps
Maintenance level human factors in aircraft mishaps can be categorized similarly
to aircrew level human factors (DON, 2000). The Maintenance Extension (ME) of the
HFACS taxonomy was adapted to classify causal factors that contribute to maintenance
mishaps (Schmidt, 1996). It contains four human error categories: (1) Supervisory
Conditions; (2) Working Conditions; (3) Maintainer Conditions; and (4) Maintainer Acts
(see Figure 8). These categories provide for multiple causations, a chain of inter-related
events, and observation between the link between components providing for a combined
approach to study human error and its causes.
Figure 8: HFACS Maintenance Extension (HFACS-ME)
(DON, 2000)
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Supervisory, Working, and Maintainer Conditions are latent conditions that can
impact the performance of a maintainer (Schmidt, Schmorrow, & Hardee, 1997). This
may contribute to maintainer act, an active failure, leading directly to a maintenance
related mishap (MRM), maintenance condition, or personal injury. Thus, the HFACS-
ME categories enable a safety analyst to identify failures at each of the four levels
historically related to accidents (Schmidt, Schmorrow, & Hardee, 1997). The working
conditions of a maintainer, as compared to those of the aircrew, will often play a more
significant role in errors observed during maintenance evolutions (DON, 2000).
Maintenance conditions have the potential to become a latent condition with which the
aircrew would have to accommodate in flight and can also directly lead to mishap or
injury through no fault of the aircrew. The three orders of maintenance error: first,
second, and third order, reflect a decomposition of the error type from a macro to a micro
perspective (see Table 2).
The following describe the categories of the original HFACS-ME taxonomy.
Supervisory Conditions may contribute to an active failure due to either unforeseen or
squadron errors. Maintainer Conditions that can contribute to an active failure include
medical, crew resource management, and personal readiness. (Schmidt, 1998)
Working Conditions include the physical environment in which the maintainer
works and the tools they use in the course of their work. Circumstances that can
contribute to an active failure include poor environmental factors (lighting, weather,
environmental hazards), inadequate equipment (damaged, unavailable, uncertified), and
uncomfortable workspaces (confining, obstructed, inaccessible). (Schmidt, 1998)
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Table 2: HFACS Maintenance Extension Categories (DON, 2000)





















































Errors and violations are active failures in the form of Maintainer Acts. Active
Failures can either directly cause damage and injury, or lead to a latent Maintenance
Condition. Errors is substandard performance due to inattention, poor workmanship, and
complacency. Violations are intended actions including both the routine or exceptional
variety. Routine violations are consistent departures from rules and regulations condoned
by management. Thus routine violations are considered to be acceptable departures from
rules and regulations. Exceptional violations are substandard practices and actions not
condoned by management. (Schmidt, 1 998).
HFACS-ME was effective in capturing the nature of and relationships among
active failures and latent conditions present in 63 Class A (hull loss or fatality) Naval
Aviation maintenance mishaps (Schmidt, Schmorrow, & Hardee, 1997), 470 reportable
(over $10,000 damage or permanent/partial disability) Naval Aviation maintenance
mishaps (Schmidt, Schmorrow, & Figlock, 2000), 124 incidents (Mishap Reports, Hazard
Reports, and Injury Reports) for Fleet Logistics Support Wing maintenance operations
(Schmidt, Figlock, & Teeters, 1999), and 15 select National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) major (hull loss or fatality) maintenance accidents. The insight into latent
conditions and active failures provides a solid perspective for trend analysis, investigation
prioritization, and control development.
(6) Maintenance Error Issues
Marx (1998) stated that human error has not been served well by conventional
accident investigation methods. These processes normally end once human error is
identified without trying to understand why it occurred. This problem has been attributed
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to several factors (Schmidt, 1998): (1) reporting criteria, (2) investigator biases, (3) report
scope, depth, and quality, (4) reporting system design, and (5) database construction. By
focusing on a human factors oriented investigation and reporting process, we can
understand why people make certain mistakes.
The prevention of accidents is critically linked to a sufficient investigation of
human factors (Harle, 1994). Such investigation methods must be properly designed,
implemented and supported. Past attempts at this have generated more superficial
information than substance (Zotov, 1996) and have failed to properly consider the human
element in the system (Bruggink, 1996). Human factors based investigation methods are
considered by aviation industry personnel to be a better form of inquiry; however, they
are not being widely used (Schmidt, 1998). Reason's model established a conceptual
framework ofhuman error that has been widely accepted throughout government,
military, and commercial sectors. Despite this acceptance, his model does not completely
define the forerunners to accidents (Marx, 1998).
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(7) Maintenance Error Decision Aid (MEDA)
Boeing Aircraft Corporation developed an event-driven tool to reduce
maintenance related accidents by assisting investigators in the identification of accident
contributing factors and recommendations for correction—Maintenance Error Decision
Aid or "MEDA" (Hibit & Marx, 1994). MEDA supports human-centered error
investigation in an attempt to encourage users to change their paradigm about
investigations of maintenance error. MEDA is based on a maintenance system model
where contributing factors are identified at each of four encompassing stages: (1) the
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individual mechanic, (2) the mechanics immediate work environment, (3) the supervision
provided to the mechanic, and (4) the organizational climate set for the mechanic
(Boeing, 1997).
Boeing collected in-flight shutdown (IFSD) due to maintenance error data from
15 airlines with 500,000 to 1 million engine hours ofBoeing aircraft between 1983 and
1993 (Boeing, 1997). Each of these errors was assigned a causal factor before being
added to the database. Success would be achieved by incorporating this system into an
organization's everyday operations with internal management of maintenance error
providing the best return (Goglia, J., National Transportation Safety Board, personal
communication with Schmidt, J., 1998). MEDA is based on process improvement and
discourages the practice of simply punishing the person who commits the error.
Investigators establish contributing factors to the event and recommendations for process
improvement, all of which are added to the MEDA database. Once improvements have
been made, this information is provided to all affected employees (Boeing, 1997).
Success has been cited by organizations using MEDA, e.g., reduction in
maintenance related incidents, improved maintenance practices (Sargent & Smith, 1999).
However, Marx (1998) notes that MEDA (and human factors based investigation
methods in general) is not being widely used. Of 92 carriers using MEDA, only 6 are in
the United States. Placing blame on workers, not transcending proximate causes,
emphasizing the static who, what, when variables, not searching for underlying causes,
and being only a philosophy vice an integrated solution were all cited as reasons for not
using MEDA and other similar tools (Goglia, J., National Transportation Safety Board,
personal communication with Schmidt, J., 1998).
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Both Galaxy and BF Goodrich have created software applications for MEDA to
transform it from a pencil and paper collection method to the information age. Galaxy
developed "TEAM"~Tools for Error Analysis in Maintenance
(www.galaxyscientific.com , 2000) and BF Goodrich (BF Goodrich, 1997) followed with
a hybrid system that incorporates MEDA and another system called Aurora
(www.hfskyway.gov , 1999). These applications allow the user to collect, organize,
analyze, and report data through an interactive graphical user interface system. Users are
able to enter new or update existing error data, create reports (e.g., MEDA forms,
contributing factors/error summaries, and audit information/checklists), and update
information on corrective actions being taken.
(8) Sharing Maintenance Error Data
The Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) program is a voluntary, but
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) sanctioned effort, to share aggregated safety
data, continuous from flight data recorders, across commercial airline carriers
(www.faa.gov
, 2000). The intent is to provide a means to examine industry wide trends
and use the derived information to enhance training of personnel, operational procedures,
maintenance and engineering, air traffic control, and airport surface safety. FAA
Administrator Jane Garvey stated, "FOQA programs are already producing the hard data
we need to identify safety records, target potential problems, and make corrections before
accidents happen (Reuters, 2000)." Data to be collected includes Ground Proximity
Warning System (GPWS) warnings, excessive rotation rates on take off, un-stabilized
approaches, hard landings, and compliance with standard operating procedures.
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Additional information includes fuel efficiency, out-of trim airframe configuration
identification, engine condition, compliance with noise abatement, rough runway
surfaces, and aircraft structural fatigue (Garvey, 1998).
Presently, 230 total aircraft consisting of 13 aircraft types are electronically
collecting/sharing FOQA data (Reuters, 2000). An impetus for sharing under the banner
of safety is that shared FOQA data is not used for enforcement purposes except under
egregious circumstances. This cooperation has not been as successful in extending to the
hangar bay and flight line in terms of maintenance and sharing error and incident data.
The FAA and NTSB both concur that this is an essential part of the overall safety
equation for increasing commercial aviation safety. One major problem standing in the
way is having a common process/taxonomy for capturing, recording, and archiving
accident/incident/error data for aggregate and trend analysis (Goglia, J., National
Transportation Safety Board, personal communication with Schmidt, J., 1998).
Boeing's MEDA, Galaxy's TEAM (Tools for Error Analysis in Maintenance) tool
and BF Goodrich's MEDA software tool all attempt to achieve a vehicle for not only
capturing mishap information, but also to share data across the industry (Goglia, J.,
National Transportation Safety Board, personal communication with Schmidt, J., 1998).
Unfortunately, though used by some of Boeing's customers (e.g., BF Goodrich in its re-
work facility), MEDA has not been adopted as an industry standard (Marx, 1998). This
is due, in part, to the in house requirement to staff such an initiative, the training
requirements involved, and issues related to unions, culpability, etc. The latter is tied to
the emphasis on the immediate act of the person and not the organizational and work
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settings that have contributed to it. Consequently, a need exists to develop a tool
encompassing accident data collection, organization, analysis, and reporting.
D. TOOL DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
(1) System Design
The usability of a product is directly linked to the user interface. A user interface
that is easy to learn and use will have favorable usability evaluations. To maximize the
usability of an interface, Shneiderman (1997) proposed eight golden rules of graphical
user interface design: (1) consistency, (2) shortcuts for frequent users, (3) informative
feedback, (4) dialogs designed to yield closure, (5) error prevention and simple error
handling, (6) simple reversal of actions, (7) internal locus of control, and (8) reduced
short-term memory load. A sense of comprehension and competence among the users
will be the end result of following these rules. If users feel familiar and competent with
systems, they will more likely them highly. (Shneiderman, 1997).
Consistency can relate to many aspects of the system: terminology, color, layout,
input, display formats, etc. Though consistency cannot always be maintained across all
dimensions of a system, symbology and methods of interaction should be consistent.
Frequent users can reduce the number interactions required for a specific result through
shortcuts. These will also increase the pace of interaction. Informationfeedback can
vary in degree depending on the frequency and severity of action involved and allow
users to more fully understand their current status by immersing them in the graphical
environment. Designing dialogs to yield closure can be achieved by grouping actions to
set up a natural flow through the user's tasks. This gives the user a better sense of the
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actions as they are being performed and a better awareness of a sequence's closure.
(Shneiderman, 1997).
Error prevention/handling allows the user to maintain confidence in the system's
fidelity and ability to recover from minor fluctuations. Reversing an action allows users
to recover from their mistakes easily, reducing stress or anxiety of operating within the
system. Designing an internal locus ofcontrol allows the users to be in command of the
environment and not vice versa. Users would not experience autonomous movement
within the environment or a drastic change of the visual orientation. Finally, the
reduction ofshort-term memory load includes access to integrated assistance information
(e.g., cues, mnemonics, standardized sequence of actions). (Shneiderman, 1997).
(2) Usability Study
Usability testing is a systematic means of observing the ease of use of a product
and collecting related data. Dumas & Redish (1994) identified three tenets of usability
studies: (1) It should be used to diagnose problems vice determining that the product is
flawless; (2) Usability testing should be employed early and often during the
development cycle; and (3) It is part of a process that focuses on usability throughout
design and development.
A thorough testing plan needs to be developed in order to best incorporate
usability into the development process. Several factors must be addressed in an
evaluation plan (Shneiderman, 1997; Nielsen, 1993; Hix & Hartson, 1993; Preece, et. al.,
1994; Newman & Lamming, 1995). First, the current stage of the design will determine
the requirements for testing, with different conditions for different stages. Second, the
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criticality of the environment helps to decide the objectives of the test. Finally, other
factors, such as the novelty of the project, number of expected users, time available, cost
of the project, available resources (e.g., time, money, people), and experience of the
testers all play a role in defining the usability study.
A usability study not only maximizes the usability of the system, but ensures
contractual requirements have been completed and to provide evidence of testing in cases
of lawsuits or if legal issues arise. Errors in a system will be tolerated to varying degrees
dependent upon the need to bring the system to full operational use and the impact the
errors may have during that time. However, a system is more difficult to test as
increasing amounts of input are required, yet these tests are increasingly needed.
(Shneiderman, 1997).
Some (Nielsen & Mack, 1994) argue for an expert evaluation of a system to
increase a product's usability. Formal reviews can provide more useful information
when compared to informal demonstrations of a product. Thus, system design and
testing should employ expert reviewers who typically produce a report detailing problems
and recommendations for improvement. These reviews may take the form of heuristic
evaluation, guideline review, consistency inspection, cognitive-walkthrough, and formal
usability inspection (see Table 3). Even if the experts are reviewing unfamiliar systems
and technologies, they still provide a fresh look at a system and are useful in evaluating
system development.
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Expert reviewers critique an interface to determine conformance
with a short list of design heuristics such as the eight golden rules.
Guideline review
The interface is checked for conformance with the organizational
or other guidelines document.
Consistency
inspection
Experts verify consistency across a family of interfaces, checking
for consistency of terminology, color, layout, input and output




Experts simulate users walking through the interface to carry out
typical tasks. Simulating the day in the life of the user should be
part of the evaluation.
Formal usability
inspection
Experts hold courtroom-style meeting, with a moderator to judge,
to present the interface and to discuss its merits and weaknesses.
Shneiderman, 1997
Usability studies take additional forms, such as discount usability engineering;
"short and sweet" approaches to task analysis, prototyping, and testing. Another style of
study is a field study conducted in actual work environments in order to achieve realistic,
user evaluation. Alternatively, beta testing challenges actual users break the system.
This method can expedite the development process and correct errors missed through
conventional testing. Usability testing can lack comprehensive system evaluation due to
time constraints and also tends to emphasize first-time usage (Shneiderman, 1997). Thus
usability studies must be supplemented with other methods of evaluation, such as expert
review. (Shneiderman, 1997).
An important decision to be made when planning a usability study is how long the
test should take (Dumas & Redish, 1994). If the study is conducted as an integrated part
of the design process and is not simply being conducted on a completed system, then the
test length should be reduced to a level to both obtain necessary information and not be a
burden. Dumas & Redish (1994) place traditional testing into four categories.
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(1) Formal testing with comprehensive test reports requires eight to twelve weeks. (2) If
a strong collaboration is exhibited among team members and a shortened report format is
used, then four to six weeks are required. (3) If a particular part of the system is to be
studied with well established procedures, then one week may be appropriate. (4) Finally,
just-in-time testing can provide useful information in a few days, if necessary, but is
discouraged.
Dumas & Redish (1994) contend proper planning includes defining goals,
identifying concerns, recruiting individuals and their participation, creating and
organizing tasks/task scenarios, deciding on usability measures, preparing test materials
and test environment, and conducting a pilot test. Defining goals and identifying
concerns is a three-stage process: (1) making choices among goals and concerns;
(2) moving from general to specific concerns helping to mold concerns into quantitative
objectives; and (3) understanding the source of the goals and concerns allowing the
usability engineer to better develop the testing scenarios and tasks. Developed user
profiles, preferably prior to system design and usability testing, can provide the basis for
deciding upon participants in a study. The realities of time and budget constraints often
result in usability studies having less participants than usability engineers (10-12) or
statisticians (at least 36-48) may desire. (Dumas & Redish, 1994).
(3) Human-Computer Interface (HCI) Design Issues
Brown (1989) posits that information database management system should be
considered a simple tool, simplifying rather than complicating the tasks of the user. Thus
the design of the system should reduce mental processing operations (learning complex
39
commands/syntax, memorizing codes/abbreviations, translating data into other
units/formats) required to operate the tool. He feels the allocation of functions, one of the
most important categories of design decisions, should be performed based on the
capabilities of both the user and the system. Brown (1989) suggests five "user" rules for
allocating functions in routine interface design: (1) Minimize the amount of procedural
memorization. (2) Reduce mental manipulation. Data should be presented clearly and in
a useable form. (3) Minimize manual entries. Allow the user to select from a displayed
list vice forcing manually entries. (4) Offer computer aids (e.g., checklists, summary
displays, and help functions) to reduce both required mental processing and the need for
executing complex, multi-step procedures. (5) Use computer algorithms to process and
present complex data.
Mental models, or a cognitive representation of the internal parts and operations
of a system, are another important part of successful HCI. The user's mental model
allows him/her to predict the appropriate procedure for a desired outcome, even if the
procedure has been forgotten. Thus, a user's mental model can give the user an
understanding ofhow a system works and develop and refine his/her knowledge when
learning about or using the system. Several principles for mental models should be
incorporated into a system: consistency (both actions and classes of actions), physical
analogies, user expectations, and stimulus-response compatibility. (Brown, 1989).
The designer should provide for a balance of ease of learning, ease of use, and
functionality in a system. Brown (1989) identifies four techniques to ensure this balance
is maintained: (1) incorporate needs of novices, experts, and intermittent users into the
design, (2) avoid excess functionality, (3) provide multiple paths, and (4) progressive
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disclosure and graceful evolution design. These procedures will ensure equilibrium is
established in a system.
E. SUMMARY
A well-defined, systematic accident investigation, analysis, and reporting process
is critical in the effort to reduce the Naval Aviation mishap rate. Yet, no one good
universal system currently exists (Marx, 1998). Such a tool must have a reporting system
relying on a solid data collection process with the ability to readily access the stored data.
Many times, mishap data is lost or not used, often leading to yet another incident. The
goal for such a tool is to use the data for prevention of future accidents.
Effectively addressing human error issues can greatly increase safety levels.
Several robust approaches to examining mishaps involving human error achieve this
goal: Heinrich's "Domino" Theory, Edwards' "SHEL" Model, and Reason's "Swiss
Cheese" Model. Once an approach is examined, a means of bridging the gap between
theory and user must be made. The Navy's Human Factors Analysis & Classification
System (HFACS) and its Maintenance Extension offshoot (HFACS-ME) appear to be
potential approaches for investigating, reporting and analyzing maintenance error.
However, the designer must maximize the usability of the interface. This can be
accomplished by following Shneiderman's (1997) eight golden rules of graphical user
interface design. Once the system is designed, a usability study with a prototype tool
ensures the product is ready for general use by testing it with a selected group of users.
Finally, Human-Computer Interface issues must be addressed to simplify rather than
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A software desktop analysis and reporting tool for maintenance error in aviation
would greatly facilitate Naval Aviation's effort to capture human factors in mishaps and
develop interventions. The Maintenance Error Information Management System
(MEIMS) is a computer-based prototype tool designed using Microsoft Access 97 and
Visual Basic 6.0. The prototype utilizes a database derived from the Naval Safety
Center's Safety Information Management System (SEMS) database, which contains
information on over 600 maintenance error related mishaps that occurred between 1989
and 1999. The system has a graphical user interface (GUI) that allows the end-user to
operate the system with basic computer skills.
The prototype was distributed to a representative sample of potential end-users.
The participants were provided a prepared task list that required them to navigate through
and utilize features of the tool. At the completion of the task list, the participants had
viewed and used all portions of the prototype tool, and completed an exit survey
composed of questions pertaining to demographic background information and both
objective and open-ended items to elicit the participants' views of the usability of the
system and value of both the system and the data. The objective data was transcribed into
a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet for analysis while a content analysis was conducted on the
open-ended survey questions. Note, the exit survey used only five Likert style questions
because the major focus of the effort was the creation of the prototype tool vice the
usability study. The questions were shaped intuitively and are considered to be simply
the first stage of developing a formalized post-prototype tool.
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B. DESCRIPTION OF MAINTENANCE EXTENSION INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (MEIMS)
(1) Overview
The Maintenance Extension Information System (MEIMS) prototype tool was
designed to allow the user to have access to the data base via three functional tools: (a)
sorting the data by queries, (b) obtaining output from the data base via written reports
and graphical displays, and (c) providing input to the data base through the addition of
new data. Each function was displayed on separate pages with interactive controls
providing user-prototype interaction. The following paragraphs provide a description of
the prototype. A completion description of all of the displays is found in Appendix A.
(2) Main Menu
The Main Menu of the prototype allows the user to select (left click) one of five
different options: (a) Query Menu, (b) Report Menu, (c) Expert Graph Menu, (d) Adding
New Data, and (e) Exiting the system (see Figure Al). Help is provided to the user on
this and all pages in the form of "control tips" (i.e., brief descriptions) when the mouse
arrow is placed over a control (i.e., text box, command button, etc.) (see Figure A5).
Additional help is found in the "status bar" at the bottom of the screen when a control is
highlighted.
(3) Query Menu
The Query Menu provides the user two manners of output (see Figure A2). The
first is through the selection of one of eight command buttons to sort the data base by one
or more of its fields: aircraft model (F-14, H-46, etc.), aircraft type (tactical aircraft
44
(TACAIR), helicopters, heavy aircraft, trainers, and others), branch of service of the
aircraft (USN, USMC), location of the mishap (ashore, embarked, and detached), mishap
classification (A, B, or C), mishap type (Flight Mishap (FM), Flight-Related Mishap
(FRM), or Aircraft-Ground Mishap (AGM)), calendar year of the mishap (1989-1999),
and any combination of the above (Multiple Criteria selection).
When a single category control is selected a sub-menu appears where the user can
define the exact description of the category via a combo box (see Figures A3 and A6).
Upon selecting the "View Selection" control a Maintenance Mishap Query window is
displayed revealing each instance (mishap) of the selected description (see Figure A4).
In addition, the user may page through all mishaps of the selection by selecting the right
arrow on the bottom of the window (see Figures A4 and A5). The data for each mishap
is displayed in text boxes, with the selected category denoted with blue background (see
Figure A4). Additionally, maintenance related contributing factors to the mishap with
their HFACS-ME codes are displayed at the bottom of the window. Selecting the
"Multiple Criteria" control on the Query Menu will allow the user to further define the
data base by selecting any or all of the seven solo categories (see Figures A7 and A8). A
Multiple Criteria sub-menu appears and allows the user to "check" the desired categories
and further define them by selecting criteria provided in combo boxes on the sub-menu.
In these cases, all of the selected categories will have a blue background on the resulting
Maintenance Mishap Query window (see Figure A9).
Throughout the prototype, "Define HFACS Codes" controls are displayed. When
selected they will provide a summary sheet of the level one, two, and three HFACS-ME
codes, with each acronym defined (see Figures A9 and A10). In addition, at any time the
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user may close a window and return to the previous sub-menu by selecting the "Close
Form" or "<Back" control (see Figure A5). Each of the four primary menus has a
"Return to Main Menu" control which returns the user to the Main Menu when selected.
The second output provided by the Query Menu is the HFACS-ME Summary
Form (see Figure All). This form allows the user to view a summary of data categorized
by HFACS-ME levels one, two, and three. The user may also further define the output
by selecting any or all of the previously mentioned seven categories via combo boxes
(see Figure A12).
(4) Report Menu
Report Menu is the second option a user may select from the Main Menu (see
Figure A13). The Report Menu offers eight reports which provide data listing the total
number of mishaps and the number and percentages ofmishaps by FIFACS-ME levels
one, two, and three (see Figure A15). The user may select from the following
distribution presentations: all mishaps, aircraft model, mishap class, mishap type, mishap
class by mishap type, branch of service, mishap location, and chronological listing by
aircraft model (see Figures A14 - A16). All reports are closed by selecting the "Close"
control at the top of the window.
(5) Expert Graph Menu
The third option from the Main Menu is the Expert Graph Menu (see Figure
Al 7). The user may create a two-axis, three-dimensional graph presentation. The x- and
y-axes are populated with one of the following categories: aircraft model, aircraft type,
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mishap location, branch of service, mishap class, mishap type, HFACS-ME level one,
HFACS-ME level two, and HFACS-ME level three (see Figure A18). The user may then
select one or more of the fields from each axis category sub-menu via a combo box (see
Figures A18 and A19). The resultant graph is presented in a three-dimensional, multi-
colored view (see Figure A20).
(6) Add New Data Menu
The user may populate the data base by selecting the "Add New Data" control on
the Main Menu (see Figure A21). The user must then fill in an "Enter New Maintenance
Mishap Data" form with the following fields: mishap class, mishap type, date of mishap,
aircraft type/model (F-14, H-46, etc.), aircraft category (TACAIR, helo, etc.), branch of
service, location of mishap, and a brief description of the mishap. The prototype
automatically assigns a Mishap Identification Number. A sub-menu on the form asks the
user to input mishap "factor" data. This information includes: a brief description of the
factors and the HFACS-ME level three code. Upon selection of the level three code, the
levels one and two codes and descriptions and level three descriptions are automatically
entered by the prototype, as is the Factor Identification Number (see Figure A23). The
user can enter an additional factor by selecting the "Add New Factor" control (see Figure
A23). After all mishap data is entered, the "Close Form" control is selected (see Figure
A23). The "Final Data Entry" form appears and asks the user to select "Enter" and wait




Students (n=42) attending the Aviation Safety Officer (ASO) course at the School
of Aviation Safety, at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA participated in the
study. Individual activities are allocated class spaces to determine enrollment in the ASO
course and, consequently, attendee demographics represent a wide cross section of Naval
Aviators and Naval Flight Officers, Coast Guard and other DOD officers, Flight
Surgeons and Aeromedical Safety Officers, and foreign nationals from all aircraft
communities. ASO course graduates are responsible for the management and
implementation of squadron safety programs to include mishaps and include
investigations and reporting. They are likely to be one of the primary end-users of the
tool. Participant demographics were characterized by aviation background, computer
experience, and availability of software and hardware systems used in the Navy and
Marine Corps.
(2) Apparatus
The ASO students had access to three computer labs (Pentium level) at the School
of Aviation Safety via login identification and password to a group account. The
computer in each lab had a full prototype functioning desktop analysis and reporting tool
loaded onto it. After a participant gained access to the computer, the "MEIMS" icon was
found on the computer desktop and selected to open the application.
The prototype was developed using Microsoft Access 2000 and Visual Basic 6.0
and consisted of four sections: database queries, reports, graphic presentations, and data
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entry. Each section was divided into further subsections allowing the participant to more
specifically design his access to the database. This allowed the participant to achieve the
four functional requirements for the software tool: data collection, organization, analysis,
and reporting (see Appendix A for a more complete description of the prototype).
(3) Instrument
A participant usability survey was constructed by the author consisting of three
parts: (1) Participant demographics, (2) Likert type assessment questions, and (3) Open-
ended items. Collection of demographic information was accomplished through the
participant selecting from a list of descriptors (rank, branch of service, experience
level/years of service). Survey questions were designed to determine if the prototype
software tool met participant investigation, reporting, and analysis requirements. The
Likert questions used a five point rating scale with verbal anchors: Strongly Agree,
Agree, Neutral, Disagree, and Strongly Disagree. Open-ended questions were included
to gain subjective responses on the overall impression of the prototype software tool,
recommendations for improvement, and comments on areas not adequately covered by
parts one and two of the survey (see Appendix B).
(4) Procedure
The prototype software desktop analysis and reporting tool containing a database
derived from Naval Safety Center maintenance mishaps was loaded on seven computers
in three computer labs with 24-hour accessibility. A MEDVIS icon was placed on each
computer desktop page to allow access into the program.
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Prototype testing occurred over a span of one week. Participants were given a
group orientation briefing by the author on the purpose, goals, and procedures of the
prototype including a projected computer demonstration. In addition, they were given a
10-page guide to walk them through prototype testing (see Appendices B and C). The
guide consisted of:
• Instructions for Accessing the Prototype Software Tool —information to log
on and open the prototype (see Appendix B).
• Prototype Software Tool Task List—a series ofplanned navigation routes
within the prototype whereby the participant would be able to view the entire
system (see Appendix B).
• Participant's Impression of the Prototype Software Tool/Exit Survey
(see Appendix C).
The author, with full knowledge of both prototype MEEMS tool and Microsoft
Access procedures took six minutes to complete the testing. It was expected that each
participant would need 15-20 minutes to complete the process. Though information on
time to navigate for each individual was not taken, informal feedback to the author
indicated a range of 15-30 minutes with the longer times being needed for those with less
computer and Microsoft Access experience. One computer was a lower-end model (i.e.,
Pentium I, 133 MHz, 4mb RAM) which caused some functions not to work properly,
most notably the expert graphing option. At the completion of the task list, participants
viewed all portions of the prototype system, and formed an opinion on its effectiveness.
Participants then completed an exit survey composed of demographic background
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questions and perusal of the prototype system. Surveys were all submitted through a
drop box provided in a common area.
D. DATA TABULATION
The data was transcribed from the survey onto a Microsoft Excel 2000
spreadsheet. The Likert questions, based on a five-point scale, were coded into Excel,
using numbers 1 through 5 corresponding to the respective anchors (Strongly Disagree,
Disagree, Neutral, Agree, and Strongly Agree). Descriptive statistics were generated
using Excel functions including the mean, standard deviation, range, and frequency
distribution of the collected data. Content analysis was conducted on the responses
provided from the open-ended survey questions. The categorization of participants by
participant aircraft maintenance organization type and computer/software application
experience level were noted. However, due to no noticeable differences between
categories, all subsequent analysis was performed on all participants as a single group.
*
E. DATA ANALYSIS
Basic and general information about the demographic and question results were
depicted using descriptive non-parametric analysis is conducted on the survey data in
order to. Basic summary statistics are developed with results including demographic
information and satisfaction levels with the prototype. Analysis of the data is performed
using the functions of Microsoft Excel.
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The 13 item exit survey was administered to 45 participants from a School of
Aviation Safety "Aviation Safety Officer" course with a response rate of 95.6% (n=43).
Each Naval Aviation command is required to have an officer trained by the Safety
School. Thus the participants were designated Naval Aviators and Naval Flight Officers
and represented a cross section of the aviation commands that make up the squadrons in
the Navy and Marine Corps.
B. DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION
The material collected in Part I of the exit survey consisted of demographic
information and established the aviation and computer experience levels of each
participant had both with computers and in aviation. The information is later used to
determine if experience level in either category affected a participant's level of
satisfaction and/or impacted the usability of the prototype MEIMS tool. The following
paragraphs characterize the survey results for part I.
Question one revealed that 39 of the participants were members of aviations units
that performed maintenance at the squadron level (n = 39, 90.7%). The remaining four
participants were either members of higher-headquarter staffs (n = 2; 4.7%) or units that
used civilian contract personnel to perform the maintenance (n = 2; 4.7%). Question two
indicated that all but one participant (n = 42, 97.7%) stated they had at least two years of
experience using a computer. The remaining participant had less than one year of
computer experience. Question three determined that all participants (n = 43; 100%)
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were users of Microsoft Office, while minimal numbers had used either Lotus Notes (n =
4; 9.3%) or Corel/Word Perfect (n = 3; 7.0%). Questionfour established a participant's
familiarity with different software applications, greater than 80 percent stated they were
familiar with at least one of the following: word processing, spreadsheet, presentation,
and e-mail (n >= 35; 81.4%). The average participant was familiar with approximately
four (4.3) of the categories (see Table 4).










# Familiar 42 37 35 11 40 19
% 97.7 86 81.4 25.6 93 44.2
Questionfive revealed the normal operating system (OS) for participants, 42
(n = 42; 97.7%) responded with either Windows 97/2000, Windows NT, or both (see
Table 5). Two participants did not answer the question. The prototype was loaded on
computers running the Windows NT operating systems. Participants could indicate more
than one OS.
Table 5. Normal Operating System of the Participant (n=41)
Windows Windows NT Mac Unix Linux
Normal OS, # 35 29 3 4 2
% 85.4 70.7 7.3 9.9 4.9
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C. PARTICIPANT SATISFACTION WITH THE PROTOTYPE MEIMS TOOL
(1) Responses to Impressions and Usability Questions
Part II of the exit survey examined a participant's impressions of the usability of
the prototype MEIMS tool and its value to Naval Aviation. Participants responded to
five statements using Likert type responses selecting from one of five responses: strongly
agree, agree, neutral, disagree, and strongly disagree. Values of five through one
respectively were assigned to the statements. One participant did not respond to any of
the statements. The participants were also given the chance to make subjective
comments on any of the five statements.
(a) Statement one asked whether or not a participant found the prototype to
be presented in a logical form. The histogram of the frequency distribution for statement
one is presented in Figure 9. The mean was 4.26, standard deviation = 0.665, range = 4.
Most participants (n = 39; 92.7%) agreed that the prototype was designed and presented
in a logical fashion. One participant did not select a response.







Figure 9: Exit Survey, Part II, Statement One, Response Distribution
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(b) Statement two asked about the ease of navigation of the prototype. The
histogram of the frequency distribution for statement two is presented in Figure 10. The
mean was 3.95, standard deviation = 0.947, range = 5. A large majority of the
participants (n = 33; 80.5%) agreed that the prototype was easy to navigate. Two
participants did not make a response to this statement.







Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly
Disagree
Figure 10: Exit Survey, Part II, Statement Two, Response Distribution
(c) Statement three. The participants were asked whether they felt
MEIMS was "interesting." The histogram of the frequency distribution for statement
three is presented in Figure 11. The mean was 4.07, standard deviation = 0.818, range
4. A large majority of the participants (n = 33; 80.5%) indicated the prototype was of
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Disagree
Figure 11: Exit Survey, Part II, Statement Three, Response Distribution
(d) Statementfour asked about the relevance of the prototype to aviation
maintenance operations. The histogram of the frequency distribution for statement four
is presented in Figure 12. The mean was 4.40, standard deviation = 0.627, range = 3.
Most participants (n = 39; 92.9%) indicated the prototype was of extreme relevance to
maintenance operations. One participant did not respond to statement four.




Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly
Disagree
Figure 12: Exit Survey, Part II, Statement Four, Response Distribution
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(e) Statementfive asked whether prototype concept was a good one. The
histogram of the frequency distribution for statement five is presented in Figure 13. The
mean was 4.71, standard deviation = 0.427, range = 2. All participants (n = 42; 100%)
indicated the concept of the prototype was a good one. One participant did not respond
to this statement.















Figure 13: Exit Survey, Part II, Statement Five, Response Distribution
(2) Responses to Open-ended Questions
Part III of the exit survey contained three open-ended questions for the
participants to respond to their overall satisfaction with the prototype. Every participant
availed himself of this opportunity to provide constructive criticism. The responses from
all 43 participants were overwhelmingly positive. Every participant indicated there was
great merit in a tool such as the prototype and all of the "criticisms" were presented in a
professional/positive manner. The desire of the participants was to take this prototype, in
its current form, and improve it for their use in the fleet.
(a) Question one asked the participant to list the most positive aspects of
the prototype. Nine participants indicated the prototype was an excellent source of data
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that could ibe used for training, trend analysis, and decision making. Others thought the
prototype was useful to provide comparisons between variables (aircraft, mishap type,
location, etc.). Some sample inputs include:
• "Recurring maintenance issues stick out like a sore thumb.
"
• "MEIMSprovides the ability to determine common mishap causalfactors and
preventfuture ones ofthe same type.
"
• "MEIMS can help us look at our highest risk maintenance working
conditions and identify those areas where we should be especially
cognizant ofpotential disaster.
"
(b) Question two asked for the most negative aspects of the prototype.
Overall comments indicated that participants with lower than normal computer "savvy"
found it initially more difficult to navigate and understand the operation of the prototype.
However, as interaction time with the prototype increased, so did the ease of operation.
Problem areas of the prototype application were focused in one of three areas: HFACS-
ME terminology, interface, and data entry.
(1) HFACS-ME. Ten participants noted the HFACS-ME
taxonomy is not an ingrained part of everyday terminology and thus found it difficult to
understand. The ability to access the HFACS-ME Code definitions from various parts of
the prototype helped, but additional explanation of the each vice a mere translation of the
three-letter acronym would have added more value to the participant. The participants
felt that any eventual end-user of the prototype would need a good working knowledge of
HFACS-ME in order to be able to get the most use out of the prototype; and that even the
training received as part of the study may not be sufficient.
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(2) Interface. Seven participants declared the prototype to not
intuitively obvious in its operation. The fear was potential end-users with a lack of
general computer skills would be discouraged from using the prototype. However two
participants commented that the prototype became more user friendly with each use. Six
participants said there was not enough on-line help available for usage training.
(3) Data Entry. Though there were only four negative comments
about data entry, they were all astute observations made by participants who obviously
had advanced computer skills (though they were indistinguishable from others based on
their demographic inputs). Comments on data entry included not having positive closure
when data is entered and being able to enter the same data twice with no
penalty/feedback. The remaining two comments were focused on unclear procedures for
data entry.
(4) Other "negatives".
• Navigation issues were minor, limited to suggestions for improved access
between pages (being able to go directly from one page to another without
having to back out of previously selected pages-four participant inputs).
• If the participant selected parameters for a desired function (graphing or
report) that were so specific that no data matched them, the function appeared
not to work. The "error" message displayed to the participant did not
satisfactorily explain the problem.
• In some instances the three-dimensional graphs in the front hide data in the
back. Also, the graphs did not fully define the "colored" categories.
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• Computer quality. There were several instances of one or more of the
functions, especially in the graphing option, not working due to lack of
memory in the computer.
(c) Question three asked for suggested changes to the prototype. The
participants brought out several key points critical for inclusion in future variations of
MEIMS. Most of the suggestions related directly to one or more of the previously
mentioned "negatives." Nine comments were made about improving the ability for the
end-user to understand HFACS-ME through either improved HFACS definitions within
the prototype, additional help/tutorial on-line, and formal training for all end-users. Eight
participants also made suggestions to improve the interface and navigation of the
prototype to increase usability (e.g., adding additional methods to view HFACS-ME
definitions and better descriptions of Levels 1, 2, and 3) . Though no specific comments
were made about data entry improvement, the "negatives" mentioned above imply fixes
to be made: providing positive feedback upon entering data, not being able to enter the
same data more than once, and making the data entry procedures simpler and more clear.
A noteworthy input made by four individual participants was in the area of "target
end-user." The original intent ofMEIMS was for it to be distributed to squadrons for use
in both data retrieval and data entry. Four participants made strong statements to the
effect that the squadron level end-user should not be able to input data into the system,
but that it should be done at a higher level, such as at the Naval Safety Center where the
understanding ofHFACS and HFACS-ME is greater and thus so is the ability to correctly
input data into MEIMS.
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Other inputs:
• Four participants indicated their desire to have more information about
each mishap available for viewing (e.g., long summary vice short
summary, adding the narrative of the mishap, etc.).
• Increasing the size of the data base by using mishaps prior to 1989 and
using hazard reports was felt to be a means of improving the quality of the
data (three participants).
• Eight specific changes to the actual interface were also suggested (e.g.,
increasing text box size in order to view all of the data field, a better
method to show aircraft model to prevent confusion by adding the
nickname to the model number: EA-6 Prowler, E-6 Mercury; being able to
scroll through the chronological report vice viewing it page by page;
separating H-l into AH-1 and UH-1 categories, etc.).
• Using a higher speed, larger memory, improved processor computer was
also suggested to improve efficiency of MEEVIS.
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
Naval Aviation has determined to reduce its mishap rate. The reduction ofhuman
error involved in maintenance related mishaps will be one step in achieving that goal;
now it has to find appropriate tools to accomplish this. The Human Factors Analysis and
Classification System-Maintenance Extension (HFACS-ME) is a taxonomy which covers
maintenance operations and falls in line with the Naval Aviation Safety Program's notion
of multiple causal factors, the idea of sequential events leading to an event, and several
established human factors theories. HFACS-ME has been successfully used to examine
human error in mishaps and incidents. The prototype MEEMS (Maintenance Extension
Information Management System) tool is a safety information management system based
on the HFACS-ME taxonomy used to facilitate the characterization and analysis of
human error in Naval Aviation maintenance mishaps. Tools such as a final version of
MEIMS will provide assistance in identifying human error patterns and facilitate
intervention development.
B. CONCLUSIONS
The participants' overall satisfaction of the prototype MEIMS tool indicated there
is a need to provide access to mishap data information for use in training, analysis, and
investigations. Participant feedback demonstrated the concept ofMEIMS to be sound
and its tie-in with Maintenance Operations readily apparent. However, the prototype
requires some adjustment before successful implementation by end-users can be
achieved.
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The prototype, itself, received slightly lower, though still very positive, ratings
than the concept of a maintenance human error related information management system.
Even though a tool can be of good intent, if it is not considered usable by the end-user, it
will sit on the shelf. For MEDVIS to be "the tool" it must have its shortcoming resolved:
• Lack of general maintenance organization HFACS-ME training including
familiarity with HFACS-ME terminology..
• Less than desirable human-computer interface for end-users with below
average computer skills.
• Poor data entry confirmation indications. The inability for the end-user to
enter data into the prototype in a simple and consistent format may lead to
inconsistent inputs and hence poor data (i.e., garbage in, garbage out).
• Also several minor shortfalls need to be refined:
• Lack of standardized and convenient navigation.
• Poor "error" messages in the cases of null data selections.
• Some three-dimensional graphs hiding data depending on the view selected.
• The inability to run the prototype successfully on some older personal
computers.
Providing solutions to these identified failings will improve the usability of future
versions ofMEEMS; and subsequently the opportunity for it to be a factor in reducing the
aviation mishap rate is enhanced.
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C. RECOMMENDATIONS
(1) Recommended Prototype MEIMS Tool Improvements
• HFACS-ME. Incorporate improved HFACS-ME definitions within
MEIMS by ensuring access to the definition page is available on every
form. Better descriptions of the HFACS-ME acronyms would also
improve usability and understanding. Incorporating additional on-line
help/tutorials will improve the end-users knowledge ofHFACS-ME and
make MEIMS a more productive tool for their use.
• Interface. A computer science expert should participate in the fine tuning
ofMEIMS interface options to ensure navigation is consistent and easily
done for those with sub-par computer skills.
• Data Entry. Ensure data entry procedures are made as simple and clear as
possible including providing positive feedback to the end-user once the
entry has been taken. MEIMS must not allow repeat entries of the same
data.
• Target End-user. Unless data entry procedures can be significantly
simplified MEIMS should be used as at the maintenance organization
level in the read/analysis mode only. Entry of data should be conducted
by higher levels (i.e., the Naval Safety Center for Naval Aviation) where
the understanding ofHFACS-ME is greater and thus so is the ability to
correctly input data into MEIMS.
• Include a longer summary/narrative for each mishap.
65
• Additional data. Include mishaps prior to 1989 and all hazard reports to
improve the quality of the data base.
• Increase text box sizes to view all data field.
• Change aircraft identifier to include aircraft nickname in addition to
type/model to avoid similar names.
• Separate AH-1 and UH-1 into two categories, vice only H-l due to the
aircraft's inherent differences.
• Change the chronological report to a scrolling view, vice page by page to
improve readability.
• If a selection is made for data that has a null value, ensure the error
message indicates the lack of response from MEIMS is due to "no data
available for selected entry" vice simply an error with the system.
• Arrange data on three-dimensional graphs so that the fields with the
largest numbers are put in the rear rows and scaled down to the front so
that no data is hidden to the end-user.
• Suggested Computer Capability. Ensure end-users understand that
computers with higher speed processors and larger memories will improve
the efficiency ofMEIMS.
• Add an option to include percentages on the three-dimensional graphing
function, vice only quantity. This will show relative weight, vice always
being more heavily weighted for aircraft types with a larger inventory
(FA-18,H-46,etc).
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(2) The Future of MEIMS. The research for this paper involved data derived
from the Naval Safety Center's data base ofNaval Aviation mishaps. A variation of the
prototype MEIMS tool could be revised to include data from commercial mishaps (both
passenger carriers and general aviation). Civilian aviation also has a record ofhuman
error, including maintenance related human error, contributing to mishaps.
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APPENDIX A
PROTOTYPE MAINTENANCE ERROR INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
SYSTEM (MEIMS) TOOL REVIEW
1. MAIN MENU
The Main Menu appears after MEIMS ICON is selected (see Figure Al).
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Figu^Al: Prototype MEIMS Tool Main Menu
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Figure A2: Query Menu
Selecf "Aircraft Model" command button.
The Query by Aircraft Model menu appears (see Figure A3).
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I Query by Aircraft Model
Select Aircraft Model Hfi
<Back View Selection
Figure A3: Quej^by Aircraft Model Sub-Menu
Select aircraft model in combo box and select "View Selection" command^button
The "Summary of Mishap" form appears (see Figure A4).
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Figure A4: Summary of Mishap Form with F14 Selected as Aircraft Type
Select the right arrow after "Record:" on the bottom line to view additional records.
F14 record number two appears (see Figure A5). Note that if the mouse arrow is placed
over a text box or other control, a control tip text appears.—7 Select "<Back" to return.
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Additional queries may be
executed by selecting any of the
control buttons on the left of the
Query Form (see Figure A6).
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Figure A6: Query Menu with Sub-Menus for Additional Queries
Select "Multiple Criteria" command button on Query Menu to more precisely define
query (see Figure A7).






































Figure A7: Query Menu with Multiple Criteria Sub-Menu
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Define query by selecting desired check boxes and detailing information in combo boxes
(see Figure A8).
gl Expert Query Form
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Select "View Selection" to view Summary of Mishap form (see Figure A9).
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Figure A9: Summary of Mishap Form from Multiple Criteria Selection.
Note that the desired selection appears in a blue text box. Select "Define HFACS Codes"





Conditions (Sq Squadron (SON)
Hazardous Inadequate Doc- Inadequate Inadequate Inadequate
Operations (HAZ) umentation (DOC) Design (DES) Resources (RES) I Processes (PRO)
Inadequate Inappropriate Uncorrected Supervisory
Supervision (IDQ) Operations (OPS) Problem (PRB) Misconduct (MIS)
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Exposure (WXE) Hazards (EHZ)
Working Equipment (EQP) Damaged (DMG) Unavailable (UNA) Dated/
Conditions (WQ Uncertified (DUC)
Workspace (WRK)B Confining (CuN) Obstructed (OBS) Inaccessible (IN
Maintainer
Acts (MA)
Error (ERR) Attention (ATT) Memory (MEM) Knowledge/ Skill Based (SKL) I Judgement/
Rule-Based (KNW1 I Decision-Making
UDG)
Violation (VIO) I I Routine (ROU) Infraction (IFC) Flagrant (FLG) Sabotage (SAB)
Figure A10: "Define HFACS Codes" Form
This form may be selected at various points throughout the prototype in order to receive
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Figure All: Query Menu
Select HFACS-ME Summary command button.
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The HFACS-ME Summary form appears and displays HFACS level 1, 2, and 3 summary
for all aircraft. Refine query by selecting desired information in combo boxes (see Figure
A12). \
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Figure A12: HFACS-ME Summary Form








_J Expert Graph Menu
_J Add New Data
_J Ewl
Figure A13: Main Menu
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Mishap Distribution - Location
All Mishaps-Chronological Listing
|
(by Aircraft; 1 389- 1999; Maintenance only)
Return to Main Menu
Figure A14: Report Menu
Select "Mishap Distribution-All Mishaps" command button to view corresponding report
(see Figure A 15).
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Figure A15: Mishap Distribution-All Mishaps Report
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Additional reports may be selected from the Report Menu including "All Mishaps-
Chronological Listing" (see Figure A 16).
Chronological listing of all Maintenance Related
Mishaps by Aircraft Type (1989-1999)
Dat? ID Cbis Typr Descrtptm
A4
1 0/26/89 466 c FRM TACTS pod d«p«Ud LAU-7 gudad mini* land}* t
1100/89 468 A FM A/C onFMCF. ENO FlmodOut
1/3«C 472 C AOM During ipouiduxi. tcft Q-OCMd ow aaau^i pi
J/5/92 iOi c FM C taopy lot inulDm w «let
1/20/53 512 c FM A£ftl«nd»d rwi» gna up. bolhinaui doramdlodu
11/1/93 526 c AOM EOD TMm M«ntw Ufu ad whccbuag five lasted if
1/7^4 264 c FM A/C DEF Coouomd FIT Duni^FCF SLAT Ct»cku« Mng DM0
AV8
3/1 2*1 48 c AOM UNCOMMANDEDENOINF. ACCELERATIONCAUSEDACFTTO STRIKE ANOTHER ACFT
3/1 6*0 82 A FM A/C DEF RWV onLDO 4 Rolled Ov«i
6/19/90 84 A FM A/C CcugttFm ooT/O Roll. PilotSucnMfully AbofedTO
813/90 23 c FM ENORaDwtoFnlLflafc
88/90 24 A FM AC CiutadmoD««tt Afte LooofEHO
1/6791 25 C FM CANOFTT DEPARTED AIRCRAFT DUR1NO FUOHT
5/9/91 26 B AOM A/C Brat. Loom Duong Higa-PovwSfrilciag BLDO
6/10/91 27 C FM AIRCRAFT DEPARTED RUNWAY AFTER SLOW LANDING
Figure A16: AH Mishaps-Chronological Listing Report
Return to Main Menu (see Figure A 17).
4. EXPERT GRAPH MENU
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Figure A17: Main Menu
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Figure A18: Expert Graph Menu and X-Axis Category Sub-Menu









and for Y axis (see Figure A 19).
Figure A19: Y-Axis Category Sub-Menu
Select "Graph It" on Expert Graph Menu (see Figure A 18). Three-dimensional graph
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Figure A20: Expert Graph (Level 2 Codes vs Aircraft Type: EA6, F14, FA18)
Return to Main Menu (see Figure A21).
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Figure A21: Main Menu
Select "Add New Data".
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Data Entry Form appears (see Figure A22).
B| lrmDataEntry07Z2 HE




























3rd Level Code [~
3rd Level Description [~
2nd Level Code P
Jnd Level Description [~
Ia Level Coder
d r
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l jlMNofl
Record! JiidP I M Ml of 1
Figure A22: Data Entry Form
Enter data for new mishap (see Figure A23). Select "Add New Factor" for each factor to
enter. When 3 rd Lev^l Code entered, 2nd and 1 st Level Codes are automatically entered by
the prototype.
Figure A23: Data Entry Form with Sample Data Applied
Once complete, select "Close Form". Final Data Entry Form appears (see Figure A24).
Click on "Enter" box to complete data
entry. Wait for check in box to appear





Figure A24: Final Data Entry Form.




PROTOTYPE MAINTENANCE ERROR INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
SYSTEM (MEIMS) TOOL EVALUATION
Background. Thank you for participating in a usability study (evaluation) of a
prototype tool for the Maintenance Error Information Management System (MEIMS).
This tool was developed by CDR Brian Wood, USN as part of a thesis project for his
Master of Science program in Information Technology Management. The information
management system was developed to effectively address and identify patterns ofhuman
error in Naval Aviation maintenance-related aircraft mishaps. The Human Factors
Analysis and Classification System Maintenance Extension (HFACS-ME) taxonomy is
the foundation ofMEIMS and is an effective method for classifying and analyzing the
presence ofhuman error in maintenance operations leading to major mishaps, accidents
of lesser severity, incidents and maintenance related personal injury cases. However,
working with a large database (approximately 600 Naval Aviation maintenance-related
mishaps in Fiscal Years 90-99) is very labor intensive. Given the capability of current
relevant database tools, an improved information management system will bring HEACS-
ME to the next level.
MEIMS captures maintenance error data, facilitates the identification ofcommon
maintenance errors and associated trends, and supports understanding ofhow to identify
human errors in the future. The target audience for this information management system
tool includes safety personnel (data entry & retrieval by unit safety officers, other safety
& training personnel, maintenance officers, maintenance supervisors), mishap
investigators-for data retrieval (Aircraft Mishap Board members, squadron safety
officers), and analysts (from the Naval Safety Center, the command's safety officer or
one from its higher headquarters). A usability study demonstrated the effectiveness of
the tool. This tool allows can directly lead to a decreased mishap rate and overall
increased mission readiness due to the training and analysis opportunity it provides.
Usability Study. You will be given a packet of instructions to guide you through
MEIMS. You will be asked to make comments on the effectiveness and usability of the
prototype system during your testing phase. Additionally, you will be asked to complete
an "exit survey" after completion of your testing. Questions will include demographic
information, objective questions about MEIMS usability, and subjective questions and
comments for areas not covered in the objective section. The study should take no more
than 15-20 minutes.
Completion ofStudy. Upon completion of your testing and survey you will be
asked to return your packet of instructions to CDR Wood's office (E-305, East Wing
Herrmann Hall). Pull this cover sheet off and put in the box marked "Cover Sheet." Put




Instructions for Prototype Maintenance Error Information Management System
(MEIMS) Tool Evaluation
Start-up
1 . Go to room E-300 (Computer Lab), E-320 (Ready Room), or E-322 (Computer Lab).
Turn on computer (does not need to be logged into NPS LAN).
Question 1: What is the name ofyour computer (aircraft name on CPU)?
2. When Log-in menu appears, select <ESC> (this bypasses log-in requirement).
3. When Desktop (main Icon screen) appears, double click (clicks are always with left
mouse, unless otherwise stated) on "MEIMS" Icon. This will start the MEIMS
application (in Microsoft Access 97).
Main Menu
4. You will now have the Main Menu displayed with the world famous Supersonic
Hornet photo in the background.
5. Note the five categories next to the command buttons on the bottom right portion of
the screen. The system has "focus" on "Query Menu". Note the information on this
button in the bottom left gray buffer above the Windows Start button. Place the mouse
pointer over the Query Menu box (don't click, if you do, select <Back> on subsequent
page) and note information that appears in the Text Box (both of these sources of
information will be available throughout MEIMS).
6. Select <Tab> and view the same information for the remaining four command buttons
(note, if you select <Exit> you will have to re-enter the system (see step 3 above).
Question 2: Is the terminology clear enough to understand what each ofthefour
command buttons does? Ifnot, what could be changed to make it clearer?
7. Select (click or tab to & enter) <Query Menu>
Query Menu
8. Note there are two sections on the Query Menu. The left half of the screen has seven
categories to help you define how you would like to view the mishap data. The right half
of the screen has four command buttons.
9. Select <Aircraft Model>
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10. Another form appears: "Query by Aircraft Model". Select your type aircraft, then
select <View Selections "Summary of Mishap" Form appears. Note, your aircraft
selection has a blue background. Review the "Brief Description" of the mishap and the
"Contributing Factors." View
Question 3: What aircraft didyou select?
How many separate mishaps ofthat type aircraft are in the database?
_
View one of the mishaps.
What are the level 3 codes & what do they mean?
How didyoufind that info?_
When you are through viewing the data, select <Close Form>
Select another aircraft model (optional).
When complete select <Back> on Query by Aircraft Model Form
1 1
.
Select another category (your option) & view the data.
Question 4: Which (ifany) ofthe seven categories do youfind useful?
Which (ifany) ofthe seven categories do you notfind useful?
12. Select <Multiple Criteria>. Create your own query using two or more criteria.
Question 5: Did youfind thisfunction useful? Why or why not?
13. Return to Query Menu. Select <HFACS-ME Elements>.
Question 6: How many total mishaps are in the database?
How many mishaps have a level one category ofMaintainer Conditions ?_
How many mishaps have a level two category of Violations?
14. Return to Query Menu. Select <HFACS-ME Summary>.
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Question 7: How many total mishaps are in the database?'_
How many mishaps have a level one category ofMaintainer Conditions?
How many mishaps have a level two category of Violations?
Further define the system by your aircraft model (or select another type).
Question 8: What aircraft didyou select?
How many separate mishaps ofthat type aircraft are in the database?
Conduct further queries as desired. When complete, return to Query Menu & return to
Main Menu.
15. Select <Report Menu>. Review the six command buttons and their functions.
16. Select <Mishap Distribution - Aircraft>. Find your type aircraft (or review another)
in the report. <Close> the report & return to the Report Menu.
17. Select <A11 Mishaps-Chronological Listing>. Review data. <Close> the report when
complete & return to Report Menu. Return to Main Menu.
18. Select <Expert Graph Menu>. Follow directions. Create one graph with aircraft
model (yours and 1 or 2 others) on the X-Axis and HFACS-ME Level One (all four
codes) on the Y-Axis.
Question 9: What aircraft didyou select?
Didyou notice a difference in the level one codes between the aircraft (ifso, what)?
Return to <Expert Graph Menu>. Try more graphs as desired. When complete, return to
Main Menu.
19. Select <Add New Data>. Enter the following three mishaps to the database:
Question 10: What is the Mishap Numbersfor the data you are entering?
Check to see if your entries were added to the database by Looking at the end of the
Chronological Listing on the Report Menu (look for your Mishap Numbers).
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Question 11: Didyou see your data in the Chronological Listing?
Return to Main Menu & Exit the Program.
20. Please fill out the Exit Survey Questionnaire.
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APPENDIX C
PROTOTYPE MAINTENANCE ERROR INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
SYSTEM (MEIMS) TOOL EXIT SURVEY
User's Impression of the Maintenance Error Information Management System (MEIMS)
Prototype Tool
Purpose: This survey evaluates a user's overall satisfaction of the Maintenance Error
Information Management System (MEIMS) prototype tool. It consists of three parts.
Part I: Demographic Information. Part l provides the user's aviation
background, computer experience, and availability of software and hardware systems
used in the Navy and Marine Corps.
Part II: \jser Satisfaction with the Four Sections ofthe MEIMS Prototype Tool.
Part II deals directly with user feedback as they use the prototype tool.
Part III: jjser Overall Satisfaction with the MEIMS Prototype Tool. Partm
allows users to give general feedback about the prototype tool.
Part I. Demographic Information
Follow the instructions after each numbered question or statement.
1 . I am attached to a command that primarily performs maintenance (military and/or
civilian) at the:




Command does not perform aircraft maintenance
Other (describe if other)
2. How long have you been using a computer?
(Select one from the list and check the box)
Less than one month
One month to less than one year
One year to less than two years
Two years or more
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3. What software do you normally use?
(Check all boxes that apply)
Microsoft Office (Word, PowerPoint, Excel, Access)
What version?
(Check all boxes that apply)
97
2000
not sure of version
other (describe if other)
Lotus Smart Suite (Word Pro, Lotus 123...)
What version?
(Check all boxes that apply)
97
9.5
not sure of version
other (describe if other)
Corel Word Perfect Office (Word Perfect, Quattro Pro . .
.)
What version?
(Check all boxes that apply)
Q Corel Office 7
2000
not sure of version
other (describe if other)
Other (describe if other)
What software application categories are you familiar with?
(Check all boxes that apply)
Word Processing (MS Word, Word Perfect, Word Pro...)
Spreadsheet (Excel, Lotus 123, Quattro Pro...)
Presentations (PowerPoint, Harvard Graphics...)
Graphic Software (Corel Draw, Adobe Photoshop...)
E-Mail (Outlook, Eudora, AOL...)
Database (Access, DBase...)
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5. What computer operating systems do you use?
(Check all boxes that apply)





Other (describe if other)
Part II. User Satisfaction with the Four Sections of the MEIMS Prototype Tool
Select the category that best matches your impression of each of the below categories
(and check the box).
Strongly Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly
Agree Disagree
I feel the information D D D
on the MEIMS tool was
in a logical form
(comments)
I found the MEIMS D D D D
tool easy to navigate
(comments)
My tour of the MEIMS D D D
tool was very interesting
(comments)
The information presented on rj rj rj D D
the MEIMS tool is relevant to
maintenance operations
(comments)
The concept of the MEIMS D D D D
tool is a good one.
(comments)
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Part III. User Overall Satisfaction with the MEIMS Prototype Tool
Please make any comments on the MEIMS Prototype Tool not reflected in your
comments in sections 1 and 2.
The most positive aspects of the MEIMS prototype tool were:
The most negative aspects of the MEIMS prototype tool were:
I would make these changes (if any) to the MEIMS prototype tool:
Thank you! Your participation is greatly appreciated!
88
LIST OF REFERENCES
Adams, Barlow, & Hiddlestone (1981). Obtaining Ergonomics Information about
Industrial Injuries: A Five-year Analysis. Applied Ergonomics , 12 (2), 71-81.
Adams, N. & Hartwell, N. (1977). Accident-Reporting Systems: A Basic Problem
Area in Industrial Society. Journal of Occupational Psychology, 50 (4), 285-298.
Andersson, R. & Lagerlof, E. (1983). Accident Data in the New Swedish
Information System on Occupational Injuries. Ergonomics , 26 (1), 33-42.
Benner, L. (1975). Accident Investigations: Multilinear Events Sequencing
Methods. Journal of Safety Research, 7 (2), 67-73.
Benner, L. (1982). Accident Perceptions: Their Implicationsfor Accident
Investigators. Professional Safety, 1 1 (2), 2-27.
B.F. Goodrich. (1997) Maintenance Error Detection Aid (MEDA) Tool. Software,
Charlotte, NC.
Bird, F.E. (1980). Management Guide to Loss Control Loganville, GA: Institute
Press.
Boemg (1997). Maintenance Error Decision Aid (MEDA), Senior Management
Overview. PowerPoint slide presentation. Seattle, WA: Boeing.
Brown, C. M. (1989). Human-Computer Interface Design Guidelines. Norwood,
NJ: Ablex Publishing Corporation.
Brown, I. (1990a). Accident Reporting and Analysis. In Evaluation ofHuman '
Work, (J.R. Wilson & E.N. Corlett, Eds.). Taylor & Francis: London.
Brown, I. (1990b). Drivers ' Margin ofSafety Considered as a Focusfor
Research on Error. Ergonomics, 33 (10/11), 1307-1314.
Bruggink, G. (1996). Accommodating the Role ofHuman Factors in Accident
Reports. ISASI Forum, 29 (2), 18-23.
Chapanis, A. (1996). Human Factor in Systems. New York, NY: John Wiley &
Sons.
Ciavarelli, A. & Figlock, R. (1997). Organizational Factors in Aviation
Accidents: Command Safety Assessment. http://vislab-
www.nps.navy.mil/~avsafety/research/orgsum.html
89
Department of the Army (DOA) (2000). Risk Management Information System.
Fort Rucker, AL: United States Army Safety Center.
Department of the Navy (DON) (1991). Naval Aviation Safety Program,
OPNAVINST 3750.6Q. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.
Department of the Navy (DON) (1997). OPNAV Instruction 3500. 39/Marine
Corps Order 3500.27: Operational Risk Management. Washington, DC: Office of the
Chief ofNaval Operations/N5 1 1
.
Department of the Navy (DON) (2000). Draft copy ofNaval Aviation Safety
Program, OPNAVTNST 3750.6R, Appendix O . Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of
Naval Operations.
Diehl, A.E. (1989). Human Performance Aspects ofAircraft Accidents. m
Jensen, R.S. Aviation Psychology. Brookfield, VT: Gower Technical Books.
Diehl (1991). Human Performance and Systems Safety Considerations in
Aviation Mishaps. The International Journal of Aviation Psychology, I (2), 97-106.
Dumas, J. & Redish, J. (1994). A Practical Guide to Usability Testing. Norwood,
NJ: Ablex Publishing.
Edwards, E. (1988). Introductory Overview fr°m Human Factors in Aviation,
(Weiner, E.L. & Nagel, D.C., Eds.) San Diego, CA: Academic Press. 3-25.
Edwards, M. (1981). The Design ofan Accident Investigation Procedure.
Applied Ergonomics, 12 (2), 111-115.
Garvey (1998). FOQA Policy Statement. Press Release 4910-13, Washington,
DC: Federal Aviation Administration.
Goetsch, D. (1996). Occupational Safety and Health in the Age ofHigh
Technology, 2nd ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, Inc.
Grimaldi & Simonds (1984). Safety Management, 4th ed. Homewood, EL:
Richard D. Irwin, Inc.
Hale, A. & Glendon, A. (1987). Individual Behaviour in the Control of Danger.
Amsterdam, Netherlands: Elsevier.
Hale, A. & Hale, M. (1972). A Review of the Industrial Accident Literature.
London, UK: Her Majesty's Stationary Office.
Hansen, C. (1988). Personality Characteristics ofthe Accident Involved
Employee. Journal of Business and Psychology, 2, 346-353.
90
Harle, P. (1994). Investigation ofHuman Factors: The Link to Accident
Prevention fr°m Aviation Psychology in Practice, (Johnston, N., McDonald, N. &
Fuller, R., Eds.). 127-148. Brookfield, VT: Ashgate.
Hawkins, F. (1993). Human Factors in Flight. Brookfield, VT: Ashgate.
Heinrich, H. (1941). Industrial Accident Prevention, 2nd ed. New York, NY:
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.
Heinrich, H. (1959). Industrial Accident Prevention, 4th ed. New York, NY:
McGraw-Hill.
Heinrich, H., Petersen, D. & Roos, N. (1980). Industrial Accident Prevention.
New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Book Co.
HFQMB (1997). Human Factors Quality Management Board Charter.
http://www.safetycenter.navy.mil.
Hibit & Marx (1994). Reducing Human Error in Aircraft Maintenance
Operations with the Maintenance Error Decision Aid. Proceedings of the Human Factors
and Ergonomics Society 38th Annual Meeting. Nashville, TN, 111-114.
Hill, S., Byers, J., Rothblum, A., & Booth, R. (1994). Gathering and Recording
Human-Related Causal Data in Marine and Other Accident Investigations. Proceedings
of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 38th Annual Meeting, Nashville, TN,
863-867. :
Hix, D. & Hartson, H. (1993). Developing User Interfaces: Ensuring Usability
through Product and Process. New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Kanis, H. & Weegels, M. (1990). Research into Accidents as a Design Tool.
Ergonomics, 33 (4), 439-445.
Kuhlman, R.L. (1977). Accident Investigation: Investigative Methods and
Techniques. Loganville, GA: international Loss Control Institute, Inc
Leplat, J. (1989). Error Analysis, Instrument, and Object ofTask Analysis.
Ergonomics, 32 (7), 813-822.




Manuele, F. (1981). Accident Investigation and Analysis: An Evaluative Review.
Professional Safety, 12 (3), 53-57.
91
Marx, D. (1998). Learning from Our Mistakes: A Review of Maintenance Error
Investigation and Analysis Systems (FAA TR). Atlanta, GA: Galaxy Scientific Corp.
McElroy, F. (Ed.). (1974). Accident Prevention Manual for Industrial Operations,
7th ed. Chicago, IL: National Safety Council.
Miller, C. (1988). System Safety fr°m Human Factors in Aviation, (Nagel, D. &
Wiener, E., Eds.). New York, NY: Academic Press.
Nance, J. (1986). Blind Trust. New York, NY: Morrow.
National Safety News
.( 1975). Work Accidents: Records and Analysis. 105(2),
160-162.
Naval Safety Center (1999). Aviation Safety Data.
http://www.safetycenter.navy.mil/aviation/Aviation_Data/Aviation_Data.html
Newman, W. & Lamming, M. (1995). Interactive System Design. Reading, MA:
Addison Wesley.
Nielsen, J. (1993). Usability Engineering. Burlington, MA: Academic Press.
Nielsen, J. & Mack, R. (Editors) (1994). Usability Inspection Methods. New
York, NY: John Wiley & Sons.
Nutwell & Sherman (1997). Safety: Changing the Way We Operate. Naval
Aviation News. March-April, 79 (3), 12-15. Washington, DC: Naval Air Systems
Command.
Pate-Comell (1996). Global Risk Management. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty,
12, 239-255.
Petersen, D. (1978). Techniques of Safety Management. New York: NY:
Kingsport Press.
Pimble, J. & O'Toole, S. (1982). Analysis ofAccident Reports. Ergonomics , 25
(11), 967-979.
Preece, J., Rogers, Y., Sharp, H., Benyon, D., Holland, S., & Carey, T. (1994).
Human-Computer Interaction. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Reason, J. (1990). Human Error. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Press.
Reason, J. (1997). Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents. Brookfield,
VT: Ashgate.
92
Reuters (2000). pAA Rule Would Make Airlines Share Safety Data.
www.yahoo.com. June 30, 2000.
Rowe, J. & Morison, S. (1973). The Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet, 9
edition. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
th
Sargent & Smith (1 999). Maintenance Error Decision Aid (MEDA). Presentation
at Investigator Workshop, Daytona Beach, FL.
Schmidt, J. (1987). Human Error Analysis. Unpublished Manuscript.
Schmidt, J. (1996). Human Error in Naval Aviation Maintenance. Presentation
at the Joint Service Safety Chiefs Aviation Conference, Fort Rucker, AL.
Schmidt, J. (1998). Human Factors Accident Classification System Analysis of
Selected National Transportation Safety Board Maintenance Related Mishaps, Chapter
g. Unpublished Manuscript.
Schmidt, J., Figlock, R., & Teeters, C. (1999). Human Factors Analysis ofNaval
Transport Aircraft Maintenance and Flight Line Related Incidents (1999-01-2981),
Society of Automotive Engineers, Inc.
Schmidt, J. & Lawson, D. (2000). Aviation Maintenance Human Factors
Accident Analysis. PowerPoint presentation. Adapted from Reason's Swiss Cheese
Model. Monterey, CA: School of Aviation Safety.
Schmidt, J., Schmorrow, D., & Figlock, R. (2000). Forecasting Return on
Investmentfor Naval Aviation Maintenance Safety Initiatives. SAE AEMR Conference
Proceedings, Long Beach, CA.
Schmidt, J., Schmorrow, D., & Hardee, M. (1997). a Preliminary Human Factors
Analysis ofNaval Aviation Maintenance Related Mishaps (983111), Society of
Automotive Engineers, Inc.
School of Aviation Safety (1998). From Dom ino Theory presentation. Monterey,
CA: Naval Postgraduate School.
School of Aviation Safety (1999). From Aviation Safety History presentation.
Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School.
School of Aviation Safety (2000). Aviation Safety Programs: Course Outline.
Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School
-
Shappell, S. & Wiegmann, D. (1997). A Human Factors Analysis ofPost-
Accident Data: Applying Theoretical Taxonomies ofHuman Error an0- A Human Error
93
Approach to Accident Investigation: The Taxonomy of Unsafe Operations. £^£
International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 7, (4), 67-81 & 269-291.
Shaw, L. & Sichel, H. (1971). Accident Proneness. Oxford, UK: Pergamon
Press.
Shneiderman, B. (1997). Designing the User Interface: Strategies for Effective
Human-Computer Interaction. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Wagenaar, W., Groeneweg, J., & Hudson, P. (1994). Promoting Safety in the Oil
Industry. Ergonomics, 37 (12), 1999-2013.
www.faa.gov (2000). Federal Aviation Administration website.
www.galaxyscientific.com (2000). Galaxy Scientific Corp. website.
www.hfskyway.gov (1999). Federal Administration website for Maintenance
Related Mishap training.
Zotov,D. (1996). Reporting Human Factors Accidents. Proceedings of the 29th






Defense Technical Information Center
8725 John J. Kingman Rd., STE 0944
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6218
2. Dudley Knox Library
Naval Postgraduate School, Code 52
411 DyerRd.
Monterey, CA 93943-5101
3. John J. Goglia
Board Member
National Transportation Safety Board
490 L'Enfant Plaza East, S.W.
Washington, DC 20594-2000
4. Jean Watson
FAA-Offlce of Aviation Medicine
Medical Specialties Division
AAM-240
800 Independence Avenue, SW
Washington, DC 20591
5. Barbara Kanki, PhD
Crew Factors, Flight Management & Human Factors Division
Mail Stop 262-4
NASA Ames Research Center
Moffett Field, CA 94035-1000
6. CDR John K. Schmidt, USN
School of Aviation Safety
Naval Postgraduate School, Code 10
1588 Cunningham Rd, Room 303
Monterey , CA 93943-5202
7. Professor Kishore Sengupta
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey , CA 93943





Naval Safety Center (Code 30)
375 A Street
Norfolk, Virginia 2351 1-4399
10. CDR Brian Wood
1737 Sunset Drive
Pacific Grove, CA 93950-2025
96

32 AT 430
11/02 22527-200 NLe




